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Although it might appear as a lost cause today, intellectual property 
scholars continue investing a considerable amount of skill, labour 
and judgment in drawing the distinction between property and 
intellectual property law.1 To a certain extent, we could say that 
wrestling with the distinction is one of the defining and foundational 
features of the law. As a curse or as a gift, the rubric of property has 
always simultaneously constituted an uneasy and slippery riddle.2 
Situated uncomfortably in the making of the discipline,3 it is not a 
surprise that even after legislative declarations, both international 
                                                       
* Lecturer in Law, Birkbeck, University of London. 
1 See Mark A Lemley, ‘Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding’ (2005) 83 
Texas Law Review 1031; Oren Bracha, ‘Standing Copyright on Its Head? The 
Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property’ (2007) 85 Texas Law 
Review 1799. 
2 Augustine Birrell was not the first and certainly not the last to discuss this complex 
relationship. Interestingly, he problematised it in the following manner: ‘The 
essence of Property is unwillingness to share it, but the literary art lives by 
communication; its essence is the telling of tale with the object of creating and 
impression and of causing repetition’ in Augustine Birrell, Seven Lectures on the 
Law and History of Copyright in Books (Cassell and Company 1899) 17. See also 
Neil W Netanel and David Nimmer, ‘Is Copyright Property? The Debate in Jewish 
Law’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 241.  
3 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, The Making of Intellectual Property: The British 
Experience (Cambridge University Press 1999) 58-59. 
Birkbeck Law Review Volume 2(1) 
 148 
and domestic;4 the reference to property is still contested, or at least, 
discussed.5 Some could say that the roots of the friction can be 
traced back to a historical strategic move to provide immunity 
against criticism.6 In this way, the compulsive property ‘metaphor’ 
was—and still is—invaluable, precisely because of its appeal to the 
imagination and the concomitant expectations promised therein. 
While the category of property has ‘little or no explanatory value’,7 
its spell produces real effects when constituting communities, 
materialising opportunities and developing agendas. 8  Yet other 
scholars may legitimately suggest that the problem is that their 
intellectual property colleagues failed to understand—or 
productively misunderstood—property concepts.9 However, the fact 
remains that somehow intellectual property managed to codify itself 
by developing controversial and effective idioms that became 
international.10 It is clear from the outset that the reference to 
property is still important as a form of criticism, review or support, 
since it appears to compel intellectual property scholars to ponder it 
and to set out its boundaries.11 Although there was no shortage of 
                                                       
4 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 2(1); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 1(1); 
Patents Act 1977, s 30(1). 
5 Henry E Smith, ‘Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1742.  
6 Clare Pettitt, Patent Inventions: Intellectual Property and the Victorian Novel 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 73-74. See also Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: 
The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press 1992) 34–37; John Feather, 
‘The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of 1710’ (1980) 8 
Publishing History 19. 
7 Alain Pottage, ‘Instituting Property’ (1998) 18(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
331, 344. 
8 Kathy Bowrey has turned to the ‘commercial, social and legal strategies in play’ to 
suggest a different understanding of the development of intellectual property rights 
in the twentieth-century, see Kathy Bowrey, ‘The New Intellectual Property’ (2011) 
20(1) Griffith Law Review 188-220. 
9 For an interesting view of intellectual property by a property scholar, see James 
Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 117-121; cf 
Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd 2008) 135-145. 
10 Justin Hughes ‘A Short History of “Intellectual Property” in Relation to 
Copyright’ (2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 1293. 
11 William R Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights (Sweet & Maxwell 1981) 3-4; Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, 
Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 1-3; Tanya Aplin and 
Jose Bellido 
 149 
scholarly discussion on the topic throughout the twentieth century,12 
we may nonetheless ask the concrete terms of the debate now and 
how it has changed so far. Arguably, the current anxiety to 
thematise, absorb or draw parallels between property and 
intellectual property has been facilitated not only by the ongoing, 
ever-lasting disciplinary anxieties mentioned above but also by a 
series of pressing factors. Among them, we can list the impact of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence,13 the rise of the knowledge economy and 
the complexities that software and biotechnology brought to the 
system.14 Since the law of intellectual property has explicitly been 
asked to ‘balance’ rights,15 the need for parameters and calibration 
has developed under a renewed sense of pressure and urgency.16 The 
interesting aspect here is not the call to ‘balance’ but the collateral 
effects it has produced—for instance, the importance attached to be 
seen providing the act of ‘balancing’. 17  This critical feature is 
evidenced by the recent attraction to intellectual property 
scholarship of regulatory discourses from different—and sometimes 
antagonistic—quarters: evidence-based researchers, policymakers, 
law and economics scholars and tort experts. Curiously enough, the 
external call to define the boundaries of intellectual property has 
also generated another irritation in the form of an internal response 
to reconsider its own sub-divisions, boundaries and organising 
                                                                                                                             
Jennifer Davies, Intellectual Property: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 2. 
12 Michael Lehmann, ‘The Theory of Property Rights and the Protection of 
Intellectual and Industrial Property’ (1985) 16 International Review of Industrial 
Property and Copyright Law 525. 
13 Lionel Bently, ‘Identity and the Law’ in Elizabeth Leedham-Green (ed), Identity 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 26-58. 
14 Alain Pottage, ‘The Socio-Legal Implications of the New Biotechnologies’ (2007) 
3 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 321. 
15 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 1994, art 7.  
16 ‘The rise in economic importance, coupled with uncertainty over the justifiable 
scope of intellectual property rights in the light of technological chance and various 
global crises relating to health, environmental protection and so forth, has given 
rise to a resurgence of “property” talk in intellectual property’ in Helena R Howe 
and Jonathan Griffiths ‘Introduction’ in Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths 
(eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 1. 
17 For a remarkable note, see Ysolde Gendreau ‘Balancing the Balance’ (2013) 44 
International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 623. 
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principles. 18  This concern can also be appreciated in the 
exponentially growing literature concerned with ‘overlaps’.19 
Howe and Griffiths’ excellent collection recaptures the lively debate 
by placing it at the core of the enterprise of categorising: legal 
doctrine. In their introduction, they gracefully point out that 
analogies between property and intellectual property have been 
‘problematic’ and that their conceptual relationship is ‘far more 
complex than it may, at first sight, appear to be’.20  Its twelve 
chapters adequately cover the two major issues around which the 
collection was initially constructed. The first part of the book 
interrogates the nature of the property in the various aspects of 
intellectual property. If the distinction between property and 
intellectual property was primarily coded in relation to its elusive 
subject matter,21 some scholars decided to focus on the concept of 
the intangible to frame their contributions. Pottage and Sherman go 
back to Roman and Medieval legal sources to make what they 
modestly define as ‘a simple point’. 22  Their contribution is 
nevertheless highly remarkable since their simple point challenges 
what has been taken for granted until now. Against a substantial 
amount of previous literature that had worked on the assumption 
that intellectual property was an ‘awkward’ sub-species of property, 
they strike back suggesting that intellectual property rights are ‘not 
peripheral, exceptional, fictional or tenuously analogous forms of 
true property rights’.23 By reading closely Marta Madero’s Tabula 
                                                       
18 Annette Kur and Vytautas Mizaras (ed), The Structure of Intellectual Property: 
Can One Size Fit All? (Edward Elgar 2011).  
19 Jerome H Reichman, ‘Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 2432; and more recently, see Estelle 
Derclaye and Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European 
Perspective (Hart Publishing 2010); Neil Wilkof and Shamnad Basheer (eds), 
Overlapping Intellectual Property (Oxford University Press 2012); Robert 
Tomkowicz, Intellectual Property Overlaps: Theory, Strategies and Solutions 
(Routledge 2012). 
20 Howe and Griffiths (n 16) 2. 
21 Bently and Sherman (n 3). See also Kathy Bowrey, ‘Book Review’ (2000) 22(7) 
European Intellectual Property Law Review 344; Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property (Dartmouth Publishing 1996) 153-156.  
22 Alain Pottage and Brad Sherman, ‘On the Prehistory of Intellectual Property’ in 
Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual 




Picta, 24  the focus on the ‘legal figure of the tangible thing’ is 
particularly productive.25 Detaching themselves from the typical way 
of looking at intellectual property, their take on tangibility thus 
allows them to reverse the argument and move to the other side of 
the coin: intangibility. They define it as an ‘effect of representation, 
interpretation and argumentation’.26 Such a statement is attractive 
for the underpinning hypothesis upon which it is based. If the 
intangible is imagined as an effect of these practices, the struggle for 
recognition is played out in the ‘material reality’ (artefacts, drawings, 
texts) from which it is elicited. Likewise, Gangjee addresses the 
matter (‘Intellectual Property as Property?’) by referring to an 
emergent form of intellectual property: brands. He states that the 
brand is ‘a remarkably elusive and protean, yet an undeniably 
valuable intangible’. 27  Drawing on an extensive literature on 
marketing, he traces the different ways in which the intangible (the 
brand) is constituted via consumer perceptions and practices.28 A 
recent case (L'Oréal SA v Bellure)29 that Gangjee identifies as the 
culmination of the EU process fully protecting brands 30  also 
provides an interesting angle to consider the way in which marketing 
concepts have been translated into the legal domain.31 What makes 
his contribution peculiarly innovative is however the second part 
that refers to immaterial labour. In fact, Gangjee develops an 
interesting critique of EU trademark law, and thus a critique of the 
property model. He suggests that ‘its doctrinal approach reinforces 
the exploitation of consumers and others involved in brand creation 
by editing them out of the narrative …’.32 
                                                       
24 Marta Madero, Tabula Picta: Painting and Writing in Medieval Law (University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2009). 
25 Pottage and Sherman (n 22) 13. 
26 ibid 28. 
27 Dev S Gangjee, ‘Property in Brands: The Commodification of Conversation’ in 
Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual 
Property Law (Cambridge University Press 2013), 29. 
28 ibid 37. 
29 L'Oréal SA v Bellure NV (C-487/07) [2009] ECR I-5185, [2009] ETMR 55. 
30 Gangjee (n 27) 44. 
31 ibid 49. 
32 ibid 57. 
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If there is one area of law in which the classificatory struggle is 
visible and upon which the dust has not yet settled, this is the action 
for breach of confidence. The reason why breach of confidence is a 
good and timely illustration for the first question envisaged in the 
collection is at least twofold. Firstly, we could say that it rehearses 
the problems of what might be at stake when the property label is 
applied to intellectual property. Secondly, it pushes the question to 
the relation between knowledge and information, a feature upon 
which the system of intellectual property was founded. Possibly 
because of its recent transformations and the categorical slippage 
produced, two contributions are exclusively devoted to the issue of 
confidentiality concerning property and intellectual property. This is 
to praise the editors: the two essays read well together because they 
are so different. Bently frames his contribution by narrating the 
different ways in which the debate around the status of confidential 
information developed in the British Commonwealth.33 By closely 
reading the different ways in which confidentiality has been dealt 
with in scholarly discussions, case law and textbooks, he ends up 
with what he calls a ‘taxonomic surprise’,34 the proposition that 
confidential information might be ‘intellectual property but not 
property’. More importantly, the piece sheds new light on the 
informal ways of explaining the way legal categories emerge.35 While 
Bently scrutinises property and intellectual property to consider the 
status of confidentiality, Alastair Hudson looks at equity to show the 
different perspectives developed by an intellectual property lawyer 
and an equity specialist.36 By focusing on the differing treatment of 
Spycatcher, he shows how the law of confidentiality has been 
appreciated differently depending on the register from which that 
interpretation has emerged.37 
                                                       
33 Lionel Bently, ‘Trade Secrets: “Intellectual Property” but not “Property”?’ in 
Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual 
Property Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 63-67. 
34 ibid 92. 
35 ibid 89. 
36 Alastair Hudson ‘Equity, Confidentiality and the Nature of Property’ in Helena R 
Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 94-115. 
37 ibid 115.  
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Central to Dreier’s contribution is an attempt to measure the 
distance between the rules on material and immaterial property. His 
contribution subtly shows how difficult and intricate the task of 
reconciliation might be. One of the most curious references is, 
nevertheless, the way in which he narrates the complex definitional 
questions around institutional self-descriptions. He says that ‘the 
history of the notion and understanding of “intellectual property” in 
Germany’ is also reflected in the ‘history of the institutional self-
description of the Munich Max Planck Institute’.38 While the sketch 
is ‘somewhat anecdotal’, 39 it is indeed an original reflection of how 
to trace the impact of legal taxonomies. Even at a speculative level, 
the example was brilliant. Following a different doctrinal trajectory, 
Breakey’s chapter reminds us of the persuasiveness and persistency 
of Hohfeldian analytical system of rights and duties. 40  Its 
commitment to the analytic is an illustration of how a ‘plausible 
account of copyright as property’ may emerge.41 He does so by 
arguing that copyright focuses on ‘the ownership of an activity built 
on a right to exclude and the property-protection of activity 
protecting it from harm and interference’.42 While the normative 
shift towards liability-rules is a revealing move, it is also possible to 
suggest that definitional anxieties would not be overcome but 
displaced. In fact, we could say that if there is a field of law 
notoriously known for its uncertainty, that is tort, where the 
meaning of standard-like concepts such as ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘fairness’ is hotly debated. In his chapter on ‘alienability and 
copyright law’, Balganesh equally surveys several problems in the 
traditional account of copyright as property. He also finds tort 
liability as a safety doctrinal valve, an arena that—he says—‘could 
provide copyright law with mechanisms that are more directly suited 
not just to its analytical structure, but also to its various normative 
                                                       
38 Thomas Dreier, ‘How Much Property is There in IP’ in Helena R Howe and 
Jonathan Griffiths (eds) Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 121-122. 
39 ibid 122. 
40 Hugh Breakey, ‘Properties of Copyright: Exclusion, Exclusivity, Non-interference 
and Authority’ in Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds) Concepts of 
Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press 2013).  
41 ibid 160. 
42 ibid. 
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goals and purposes’.43 Again, it is difficult to see how these different 
goals and purposes could be accommodated as a matter of principle.  
The second part of the collection assembles contributions addressing 
a different question. The quest is not the assessment of the 
distinction but the consideration of whether property concepts may 
be used to remake intellectual property in order to ‘ensure an 
appropriate balance’.44 At first glance, the approach could be seen as 
contradicting some contributions given in the first part of the volume. 
However, it is not. Turning the pages, it becomes evident that several 
contributors interpret property (and intellectual property) differently. 
In so doing, their investment in those concepts gives a plethora of 
meanings to the institution of property and to its potential 
applicability to intellectual property regimes. Nowhere is this clearer 
than in Michael Carrier’s stimulating chapter.45 Instead of arguing 
that property has extended copyright, Carrier contends that the 
property-link may provide limits to copyright. 46  He offers a 
reconsideration of boundaries on three different levels (exclusion, 
transfer and use) to claim that propertisation may provide ‘the tools’ 
for the task.47  In a similar vein, Burrell and Hudson’s chapter 
sketches another avenue that could ameliorate problems perceived in 
the contours of copyright. 48  According to them, the case of 
abandonment offers a compelling example to show how property 
theories may be protective of authors.49 Given that the doctrine 
‘respects their capacity to control how and whether they exploit the 
rights’;50 their view is also compelling, albeit their cautious approach 
                                                       
43 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Alienability and Copyright Law’ in Helena R Howe 
and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 180. 
44 Howe and Griffiths (n 16) 5. 
45 Michael A Carrier, ‘Limiting Copyright through Property’ in Helena R Howe and 
Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
46 ibid 190-195. 
47 ibid 204. 
48 Robert Burrell and Emily Hudson, ‘Property Concepts in European Copyright 
Law. The Case of Abandonment’ in Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), 
Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press 
2013). 
49 ibid 206-207 and 223. 
50 ibid 207. 
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as to the prospects of such strategy being successful.51 What deserves 
to be highlighted is how subversive and creative these two last 
chapters (Carrier and Burrell/Hudson) appear since their target is the 
legal structure of copyright. Mobilising property theories and 
constructs such as the commons and anticommons, Lametti and 
Dusolier submit different proposals. On the one hand, Lametti also 
suggests that there is plenty of ‘very good property theory’ to limit 
intellectual property.52 However, the most remarkable feature of his 
contribution is not the reference to property theory but how he 
attaches a considerable importance to intellectual property 
governance as a system of ordering knowledge. 53  In fact, these 
references are exceptional because the collection does not seem to 
extend much on the status of intellectual property as a bureaucratic 
reality. Only a few of the contributors eventually connect intellectual 
property with patent and trade mark offices.54 While it could be 
argued that their corresponding silence might be due to their 
exclusive focus on copyright, the rise of copyright collecting societies 
and their role in stabilising copyright could have provided some 
interesting theoretical reflections. On the other hand, Dusolier’s 
chapter could be seen as an attempt to follow the difficult migration 
of concepts developed in law and economics to intellectual property. 
Her proposal is an attractive call for a legal model of ‘inclusivity’ to 
unify a legal theory of commons.55 The last chapter, written by one 
of the co-editors, endeavours to make the intersection visible 
between intellectual property law and the fight against climate 
change. 56  Rather persuasively, she moves from the concept of 
                                                       
51 ibid 231. 
52 David Lametti, ‘The Concept of Anticommons. Useful, or Ubiquitous and 
Unnecessary?’ in Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of 
Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
53 ibid 244-246.  
54 Gangjee (n 27) 29-59. 
55 Séverine Dusollier, ‘The Commons as a Reverse Intellectual Property: From 
Exclusivity to Inclusivity’ in Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), 
Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press 
2013). 
56 Helena R Howe, ‘Property, Sustainability and Patent Law – Could the 
Stewardship Model Facilitate the Promotion of Green Technology?’ in Helena R 
Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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property to the more specific question of how ownership can be 
imagined differently. If intellectual property could be blamed for 
exhibiting a particular (individualistic) predilection, Howe finds it 
helpful to bring in the concept of ‘stewardship’,57 as a way to 
articulate a more community-orientated regime of intellectual 
property.58  
After reading the contributions, there is a sense that the view from 
property scholars should have also been gathered, at least to provide 
an interesting counter-point. While we know now how intellectual 
property scholars struggle with property concepts, it might have 
been interesting to bring in property scholars to see how they 
observe the distinction. A recent collection on the philosophical 
foundations of property makes only a brief couple of references to 
intellectual property.59 Interestingly, the way one of the contributors 
demarcates the discipline has much to tell us. His first footnote 
included the following introduction: ‘I will say nothing here about 
intellectual property. Nor shall I even comment on whether it is 
usefully characterized as property at all, or whether any unification 
of property and intellectual property is to be sought’.60  
 
                                                       
57 ibid 298-304.  
58 ibid 298. 
59 Simon Douglas and Ben McFarlane, ‘Defining Property Rights’ in James Penner 
and Henry E Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 240; and Arthur Ripstein, ‘Possession and Use’ in James 
Penner and Henry E Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 156. 
60 Arthur Ripstein, ‘Possession and Use’ in James Penner and Henry E. Smith (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 156. 
See also Lemley (n 1). 
